

The Disciplinary Dislocations of (Architectural) History

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The last thirty years have seen tremendous changes in the discipline of architectural history. *Oppositions*, *Assemblage*, and *ANY* have defined the ever more intense interconnections among history, theory, and practice.¹ The *JSAH* and the *Journal of Architectural Education* have expanded disciplinary horizons. MArch programs have multiplied, as have Ph.D. programs. Publishing houses have defined a rapidly growing readership of art and architecture books. Though these developments can still be held together in a discipline as wonderfully amorphous as architecture, the increased pressures toward the scholarly, on the one hand, and the technical and professional, on the other hand, have created the potential for a possibly irrevocable split in architectural education between studio production and advanced intellectual production.² Architectural history is, for the most part, still linked to both, but as time goes by, the gap between the academic world of the studio and the academic world of historians will become increasingly difficult to bridge. There will, of course, always be an overlap, but the familiar multidisciplinary of architectural education is fast becoming a residual part of architecture's humanistic mission.

The origins of architecture's disciplinary divisions can be traced to the infusion, in the 1940s and 1950s, of neo-Kantian psychology into architectural discourse—through the works of Rudolf Arnheim and Suzanne Langer, in particular.³ They added a metadisciplinary horizon to the more introverted theorizations of the Moderns. But in the 1970s,

the call was for a more forceful rethinking of architecture. In parallel intellectual worlds, one found Robert Venturi reading Cleanth Brooks, Charles Jencks reading de Saussure, Christian Norberg-Schulz reading Heidegger, Peter Eisenman reading Wittgenstein, and Charles Moore reading Theodor Lipps. All this came with the acute awareness that philosophers were themselves drawing modern art and architecture into their discourses. Heidegger wrote on van Gogh, Foucault on Magritte, Eco on Pollock, and Deleuze and Guattari on Klee (later, of course), and, most famously, Derrida on Eisenman.⁴ This was not a matter of fashion, as some held. It was about foundation.⁵ Even Colin Rowe, playing both sides of the game, was a pivotal player. Nested within the pages of *Collage City* (1978), for example, was an important element of the new thinking, a challenge to the primacy of architecture's traditional historicity. Quotations from Karl Popper, Ortega y Gasset, and Ralph Waldo Emerson, in bold text, evoked the philosophically mediated status of both architectural history and architectural practice. They sent a clear message, not only about the existence of a larger discourse, but also about a more complex system of disciplinary obligations.

Though the *terminus ad quem* toward which postmodernist intellection strove was never clearly spelled out, the overall result was an architecture that was more methodologically interesting than anything produced in the 1940s and 1950s. Even Charles Jencks and Nathan Silver's 1971 book *Adhocism*, a work still known for its refreshing accep-

tance of pop culture, articulated the need for a type of history-of-technology that at the time did not yet exist.⁶ But whatever the focus, it was understood that an essential part of the argument was the need to balance historical recovery with contemporary speculation.⁷ The demand found its way into the writings of Vincent Scully. In *Shingle Style Today or the Historian's Revenge* (1974), he asked his readers to turn to Harold Bloom's *The Anxiety of Influence. A Theory of Poetry*, which had been published the previous year.⁸ After all, he had changed Bloom's term "strong poet" into "strong architect." Such a radical and overtly advertised move would have been unthinkable twenty years earlier.

The impact of all this on academe is by now a familiar story. MArch programs—at Harvard and MIT, for example—were created in which it was hoped that the new speculations could be better accommodated and the level of maturity enhanced. Some of these programs, like the Architectural Association in London, the Masters in Environmental Design, founded in 1966 at Yale under the leadership of Charles Moore, and SCI-Arch, founded in 1972, saw themselves in the vanguard.

By the 1990s, postmodernist intellection had developed into four relatively autonomous disciplinary environments, namely, phenomenology, preservation, computation, and history/theory. For the first three one need only think, respectively, of McGill University and Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Columbia University's preservation program and Robert Stern, and the computation programs at UCLA, Harvard, and MIT. History was also developing its academic pedigree, with advanced research programs being developed in schools of architecture at MIT, Cornell, and Princeton, and then later at Columbia, Virginia, and Harvard. Generally speaking, these programs were opposed to the phenomenologically oriented, inspirationalist pedagogies of the design studio, as well as to the superficiality of postmodern historicism.⁹ But because they hoped to better ground architectural history in the new methodological approaches of postmodern intellection, they rejected many of the traditional methodologies of art history, often forcing an institutional break from art history programs (as at Cornell, Princeton, and Harvard). Among the founders of new architectural history programs were Bruno Zevi at the Institute for the History of Architecture in Venice, Stanford Anderson and Henry Millon at MIT, Alexander Tzonis at the Architectural Association, Anthony Vidler at Princeton, Manfredo Tafuri at the University of Venice, Kenneth Frampton at Columbia University, and Werner Oechslin and Kurt Forster at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule.

The creation of these programs was paralleled by the hiring, in the 1970s, of historians by schools of architecture.

A second generation of scholars then emerged in the 1980s that began to extend the premise of postmodernist intellection in the direction of what is now called "theory."

In one way or another, these two generations of scholars increased the space of inquiry between advanced scholarship and architectural production. They supported avant-gardism, or some critical variant thereof, while critiquing the modernist historiographical assumptions on which it was based. Anderson's dissertation on Peter Behrens (1968) was especially important,¹¹ as were Tafuri's and Frampton's attempts to broadly redefine the role of contemporary architecture.¹² They mapped out a range of work that moved, on the one hand, from a critique of contemporary postmodernist historicism toward a renewed understanding of avant-gardist history, and, on the other hand, from a critique of context toward a more vigorous understanding of postmodernist-avant-gardist ontology. Significant in this regard were also Iain Boyd Whyte's work on Bruno Taut, Mark Wigley on Jacques Derrida, Michael Hays on Hannes Meyer, Hélène Lipstadt on Charles and Ray Eames, and Neil Levine on Frank Lloyd Wright.¹³ Other scholars, picking up on the work of Edward Said, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu, pushed ahead with contextualist issues, or with the question of colonial and postcolonial architecture. Among them are Gwendolyn Wright, Diane Ghirardo, Sibel Bozdoğan, Beatriz Colomina, and Zeynep Çelik.¹⁴ Scholars such as Dolores Hayden and Alice Friedman, but also Diane Ghirardo, work on issues of gender and feminist historiography.¹⁵

It would be a mistake to argue that this expansion and intensification of the history-theory discourse constituted an abandonment of the erstwhile postmodernist search for an epistemologically restructured architecture. On the contrary, it served to bring modern architecture up to speed with its own critical modernity, allowing for a fuller exploration of issues relating to context, gender, and politics than can be accomplished today in studio teaching. It also served to resist the revived neomodernist historiographic impulses introduced into architectural education through technology and computation.

But the benefits do not come uncontested. As architectural history (and by that term, I include "theory") is being measured more and more by the scholarly protocols of the humanities, it becomes ever more remote from the concerns of architectural practice. The very success of postmodernist intellection forces history and theory away from the very thing that they were intended to reform, with the result that architecture, floating free from intellectual self-reflection, gravitates all the more easily toward the one-dimensional world of professional practice. This means that

the present generation of scholars is now forced to deal with the problem of how to interrelate the differing and increasingly contradictory locations of architectural history.

This brief outline of some of the developments in our discipline will be sufficient, hopefully, to shift the focus from the more immediate issues of disciplinary politics to the question of what a "disciplinary history" is to begin with. As Michel Foucault and, more recently, Dominic La Capra have shown, the history of the academy should not be relegated to the back seat of historiographic speculation.¹⁶ The history of the academy is in many respects the driving agent of intellectual history, for its structure parallels ongoing debates about objectivity. Unfortunately, intellectual history, as we would normally understand the term, is still seen as the history of either the work of individual scholars or that of particular historical thematics. It thus fails to address the problem of how intellectual history—conditioned as it is by disciplinary formations—fits into the framework of modernity's fundamental ambiguity toward intellection. But it is exactly this problem that is at the heart of architectural history and thus must be better understood.

It would, first of all, be inaccurate to argue that "theory" was an import to our discipline, forced in from outside the profession.¹⁷ It would be more accurate to hold that although interdisciplinary exchanges helped to establish the principle of a uniquely postmodern understanding of the intellectual, there remains an underlying uncertainty as to where to position intellection in the context of its own disciplinary historiography.¹⁸ How does one define the aim and purpose of the history of architecture now that postmodernism has to be treated not only as a determinant theoretical problem, but also as a historical problem within the domain of advanced speculation?

If the new, self-contradictory location of architectural history in academe has created a historiographic crisis that forces scholars to actively speculate on their identity as "historians," the problem is not made easier by the contaminations of our own, often falsely objectivizing culture. Take, for example, Robert Venturi's *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (1966) and Venturi and Scott Brown's *Learning from Las Vegas* (1972).¹⁹ When the former was reprinted in 1977, the publisher—wanting, no doubt, to cash in on the expanding market—enlarged the tiny illustrations and gave them proper captions and credits. When the second book was reprinted in the same year, Venturi's own architectural work, an important part of the operative connection of theory to practice, was replaced by a bibliography! These examples illustrate that the more rigorously scholarly expectations are embedded in the disciplining of "theory," the more the discourse is affected in ways that transcend the

merely editorial. If it is our responsibility as educators to advise students that they are using a "revised" version of Venturi's book, then giving them a photocopy of the original (if one can get legal permission to do so!) does not solve the problem. The knock-off constructivist necktie, Venturi's take on Baroque architecture, and the revisionist officializing of "theory"—not to mention our own post-Foucauldian, contextualizing ambitions to rewrite modernist historiography—are symptoms of the same thing, namely, the manipulations that by necessity and critique go into the construction of history. But where does this "history" as an operation of self-produced reflection fit into an architectural education that is less and less interested in its own historical complexity?

The irony is that even though advanced speculation, by definition, must relate back to the philosophical and epistemological problems that drive architecture, architects who want to participate in the discourse are limited to less evolved discursive structures of postmodernity. Even though the avant-garde traditionally likes nothing better than to become the (dislocated) subject of (its own dislocated) historiography, in democratizing history and transforming it into the pop culture of studio, the avant-garde has to work, ultimately, against the intellectual agenda of its own ambitions. And this means that as advanced architectural speculation becomes itself ever more "a discipline" by closing off rather than opening up, the less it recognizes the philosophical premise of its own postmodernist dislocations.²⁰ As the spate of books by Rem Koolhaas, Bernard Tschumi, Gevork Hartoonian,²¹ and others demonstrates, architects now mainly talk to other architects. On the surface, Tschumi's interest in 1960s modernist ephemeral architecture, Koolhaas's interest in the 1950s, and Hartoonian's interest in Mies van der Rohe force (or reinforce) the hand of the historian—and this, hopefully, still in a positive way. But Tschumi's late-Barthian theoreticity, Koolhaas's careless and almost comical use of historical evidence, and Hartoonian's narrow reading of Adorno are at odds with the rapidly maturing demands of theory's historical discourse. In other words, the avant-garde—like history itself—is torn between its *self-created* academizations, on the one hand, and its drive to insinuate itself into pop-historical culture, on the other hand. Whether one should see this as a positive—namely, as a new brand of revisionism replete with its own self-generated interest in the 1950s and 1960s—or as a negative—namely, as a survival of an atavistic discourse in which the avant-garde becomes simply the trope of its eternal return!—has yet to be seen.

What remains clear, however, is that the postmodernist project of history-as-critique will become increasingly inac-

cessible to the avant-garde that once so eagerly promoted it. For historians, at least, this presents a double bind: the need to understand the problematics of postmodernist culture within their own historical drives, *and* to critique those drives as they become increasingly detached from the vague humanist aspirations that once energized the debate. The desire for greater inclusiveness that was so important in the 1960s has become impossible to maintain as discourses become more focused and territorialized.²² But as territories become more distinct, the problem of territoriality itself becomes ever more acute, with architectural history having now to be written against the grain of a dialectic in which the word “architectural” becomes a perpetually irritating attachment to (its own) history.²³ The reason is that as visual studies, feminist studies, colonial studies—to name a few recently formed academic specialties—become increasingly autonomous, architectural history will have to work hard to redesign its own territorial understanding. It would be wrong, however, to see this simply as a rejection of the traditional notion of architectural history; rather, it is a part of a process that reclaims history’s homelessness in the disciplinary politics of modern thinking.

An architectural history that includes reflection on the problematics of its discursive historiography is thus bound to raise more questions than it can answer, especially since the project that interrelates history and the avant-garde, as competing macrohistoriographic phenomena, is complex, with the various components more interconnected than one might surmise, and more subject to spillover than one wants to admit. But how can we follow the dictates of objectivity, knowing full well that we still function within an intellectual project that demands objectivity be precisely that which is rendered unstable. It is not that objectivity is impossible, only that it remains traumatized by the dialectics of a disciplinary intellection that now can only *pretend* to have survived the dislocations of postmodernist speculation. The solution to this conundrum is not as easy as saying that scholarship today possesses enough methodological wherewithal to handle the complexities of its intellectual history, especially when its intellectual history is so often left out of the equation.

Once again the problem is not only how to conduct research, but also how to navigate in a world that is split between scholars, who presumably would want to establish—or at least be able to properly conceptualize—ever more critical positions, and architects, who, in claiming to be critical, demand that the historian support their efforts at reforming both studio teaching and the profession. Since historians are not yet completely severed from design, they will still have the awkward obligation to master architec-

ture’s multiple narrative environments, often in defiance of some of the interests that govern them. But how should that demand be met, and who is qualified to speak on the subject? No matter how one answers these questions, historians will ultimately have to pay the price for hesitating in this space of inquiry. They will either have to betray the field dear to them in the name of one type of criticality, or defend the root anti-intellectualism of architecture. Furthermore, historians now have to work within the increasingly tight constraints of three-year graduate design programs where they face the still immature historiographic methodologies of competing fields such as technology and computation. As the criticality of history becomes ever more out of step with the criticality of advanced design, the teaching of history and theory in schools of architecture will lose its once privileged position as a key player in the extended world of architecture’s intellectual debate.

This means that in the future the “intellectual history” of the discipline of architectural history will become easier to chart as its territory becomes less and less contaminated by cross-currents of exploration and more and more academically self-protective. But the question of the intellectual history of the *past* three or four decades—taken in its broadest sense as a history that is still at work in our discipline—remains an open-ended question. After all, how does one historicize our discipline now that its postmodernist intellections have impacted the very history needed to investigate it? It is a “history” in which the present is being refigured, not as a mandate for architecture (that, alas, would probably be wishing too much these days), but rather as a mandate for a new architecture of architectural history. We will have to study the transitional—and translational—structures of our discipline in order to recognize what our options are for the future. But the problem is that the (post-modernist) scholarly Self as a site of intellectual interrogation is still trapped in the modernist, pop-avant-gardist space of antihistoricism and is thus left untouched as a historical project, even though it has embedded within it the very secrets not only of our modernity, but also the modernity of our future subject matter. And so, just as there is no “historical whole” with respect to the historiography of twentieth-century Modernism, there is also no radically open slate of opportunities either. In this in-between space, which is both captive and fluctuating, micro practices are continually being contaminated by the concealed structure of macro realities. One cannot escape the historical guilt, so to speak, that is embedded in this process, but one can force out of hiding the dialectics that still lie hidden within the continuing postmodernist ambiguity about where exactly to locate (architectural) knowledge.

Notes

1. This article is the companion piece to Mark Jarzombek, "Prolegomena to a Critical Historiography," *Journal of Architectural Education* 52/4 (1999): 197–206; "The Saturations of Self: Stern's (and Scully's) Role in (Stern's) History," *Assemblage* 33 (1997): 6–21.
2. Indeed, at the University of Virginia, just a few years ago, the Ph.D. program in architectural history disassociated itself from the Department of Architecture to become an independent department under the same dean. Though in some sense it seemed to be a new development, it was in reality an extension of the battles that began in the 1940s, when art history programs began to split off from studio education.
3. See Kazys Varnelis, "The Education of the Innocent Eye," *Journal of Architectural Education* 51 (May 1998): 212–223; and Mark Jarzombek, "Describing the Language of Looking: Wölfflin and the History of Aesthetic Experientialism," *Assemblage* 23 (Summer 1994), 28–69.
4. The culmination of all this is Jacques Derrida, "Why Peter Eisenman Writes Such Good Books," in Marco Diani and Catherine Ingraham, eds., *Reconstructing Architectural Theory* (Evanston, Ill., 1988), 99–105.
5. Though postmodernist intellection has frequently been challenged as little more than fashion, I would argue that it was precisely as fashion that it enabled intellectuals with different disciplinary backgrounds to participate in the postmodernist processes of theory formation. Nonetheless, as late as 1994, William J. R. Curtis wrote that

a criticism based upon the experience and analysis of actual architectural objects in their precise settings seems more than ever necessary at a time when architecture is once again being buried under smoke screens of "theory," and when theorizing about an artist's post-rationalisations is sometimes confused with the functions of criticism. A distinction needs to be drawn between architectural and other kinds of ideas and between the structure of thought behind a work and a mere dressing with fashionable (and usually ill digested) philosophical quotations on the other. (William J. R. Curtis, "Alvaro Siza: an Architecture of Edges," *El Croquis* 68/69 (1994): 33.)

I would argue that this "critique" of theory is discredited by its attempt to pretend that it itself is *not* theory. In other words, "theory" here might be precisely too well digested.
6. Charles Jencks and Nathan Silver, *Adhocism, The Case for Improvisation* (Garden City, N.Y., 1973). According to the authors, "Beyond its utilitarian aspects, adhocism gives rise to whole new areas of inquiry and speculation" (p. 9). This form of discursive interdisciplinarity of historical research and critical practice is far from dead; there is a direct line between these early postmodernist forays and the work of Paul Virilio.
7. Among the texts of English-speaking authors that interested architectural theorists were Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, 1962); Karl Raimund Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York, 1965), and *Conjectures and Refutations; the Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (New York, 1965); and Harold Bloom, *A Map of Misreading* (New York, 1975). European authors were filtered through the protocols of translation. Barthes, for example, came to be known among American architects only in the late 1960s after the publication of *Elements of Semiology*, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York, 1968) and *Writing Degree Zero*, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York, 1968). There were also, among others, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York, 1972); Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York, 1973); Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization; a History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard (New York, 1965); Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York, 1971).
8. Vincent Scully, *Shingle Style Today or the Historian's Revenge* (New York,

1974), 2. See also p. 22.

9. David Watkin, in *The Rise of Architectural History* (Chicago, 1980), makes no reference to the opposition between architect and historian or the rise of academic programs in architectural history. Nor does the book make any reference to the academic histories that are tied to architectural historical discourse.
10. Examples from the 1970s and 1980s would include among others Margaret Crawford (with a Ph.D. from U.C.L.A.), at SCI-Arch; Elisabeth Grossman (Ph.D., Brown University) at Rhode Island School of Design; Christian Otto (Ph.D., New York University) at Cornell; Richard Chafee (Ph.D., Courtauld Institute) at Roger Williams; Howard Burns (M.A., University of Cambridge) at Harvard; Mary McLeod (Ph.D., Princeton) at Columbia; K. Michael Hays (Ph.D., MIT) at Harvard; Mark Wigley (Ph.D., Auckland University), and Beatriz Colomina (Ph.D., School of Architecture, Barcelona) at Princeton; Jennifer Bloomer (Ph.D., Georgia Tech) and Cathrine Ingraham (Ph.D., John Hopkins) at Iowa State; and Mark Jarzombek (Ph.D., MIT) at Cornell. In the 1990s one should mention, among others, Gail Fenske (Ph.D., MIT) at Roger Williams College, Peggy Deamer (Ph.D., Princeton) at Yale, Vikram Prakash (Ph.D., Cornell) at Washington State University, Kazys Varnelis (Ph.D., Cornell) at SCI-Arch, Nana Last (Ph.D., MIT) at Rice, and Reihold Martin (Ph.D., Princeton) at Columbia.
11. Anderson wrote his influential dissertation, "Peter Behrens and the New Architecture of Germany 1900–1917," at Columbia University (1968). Portions of it have been published in "Modern Architecture and Industry: Peter Behrens, the AEG, and Industrial Design," *Oppositions* 21 (Summer 1980): 78–97, and in "Modern Architecture and Industry: Peter Behrens and the AEG Factories," *Oppositions* 23 (Winter 1981): 52–83. Anderson, currently chairman of the Department of Architecture at MIT, was the director of the History-Theory-Criticism Section from 1975 to 1995. See Martha Pollak, ed., *The Education of the Architect: Historiography, Urbanism, and the Growth of Architectural Knowledge: Essays Presented to Stanford Anderson* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997).
12. Kenneth Frampton is currently Ware Professor of the History of Architecture at Columbia University. Among his numerous works are *Modern Architecture and the Critical Present* (New York, 1982) and *Studies in Tectonic Culture: The Poetics of Construction in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Architecture* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995).
13. Iain Boyd Whyte, *Bruno Taut and the Architecture of Activism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982); Mark Wigley, *The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida's Haunt* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993); K. Michael Hays, *Modernism and the Posthumanist Subject: the Architecture of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilberseimer* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992); Hélène Lipstadt, "Natural Overlap: Charles and Ray Eames and the Federal Government, 1948–1978," in Donald Albrecht, ed., *The Work of Charles and Ray Eames: a Legacy of Invention* (New York, 1997), 150–177; Neil Levine, *The Architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright* (Princeton, 1996).
14. Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago, 1991); Diane Ghirardo, *Building New Communities: New Deal America and Fascist Italy* (Princeton, 1989); Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation-Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (Seattle, forthcoming); Beatriz Colomina, *Sexuality & Space* (New York, 1992); Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle, 1986).
15. Dolores Hayden, *Redesigning the American Dream: the Future of Housing, Work, and Family Life* (New York, 1984), and Alice T. Friedman, *Women and the Making of the Modern House: a Social and Architectural History* (New York, 1998).
16. Foucault once asked,

How has the subject been established at different moments and in different institutional contexts as an object of knowledge that is possible, desirable, or even indispensable? How does the experience one can have of oneself, as well as the knowledge that one can form from that experience, been organized by certain schemas? How have those schemas been defined, valorized, recommended, imposed?

Quoted in Jan Goldstein, "Foucault and the Post-Revolutionary Self: The Uses of Cousinian Pedagogy in Nineteenth-Century France," in Goldstein, ed., *Foucault and the Writing of History* (Oxford, 1994), 99. See also Peter Novick's *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge, 1988). An excellent book that admits some of the same problems is Sande Cohen's *Historical Culture: On the Recoding of an Academic Discipline* (Berkeley, 1986). Also relevant methodologically is Dominic La Capra, *Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language* (Ithaca, 1983).

17. See Kazys Varnelis, "Postmodern Permutations," *Thresholds* 18 (Spring 1999): 24–31. See also Stanley Tigerman, "Has Theory Displaced History as a Generator of Ideas for Use in the Architectural Studio, or (More Importantly), Why Do Studio Critics Continuously Displace Service Course Specialists?" *Journal of Architectural Education* (September 1992): 48–50.

18. Peter J. McCormick's *Modernity, Aesthetics, and the Bounds of Art* (Ithaca, 1990) is an excellent work on the subjectivity argument of nineteenth- and twentieth-century aesthetic theories. But since it approaches the history of philosophy as the history of leading professional philosophical talent, it silently reinforces the notion that intellectual history is the history of privileged subjectivity. There are very few histories of philosophy that stoop down, so to speak, to investigate the relationship between "high" philosophy and philosophy as a form of popular culture.

19. See Robert Venturi, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (New York, 1966). Compare this with the 1977 edition from the same press. See also Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour, *Learning*

from Las Vegas (Cambridge, Mass., 1972). Compare this with the 1977 version by the same press.

20. This is also true in avant-garde art. In the 1960s Lacan was read by a group of feminist artists and incorporated into various aspects of their work. Today, with Lacanianism becoming increasingly self-regulatory, its ability to connect to aesthetic practice is reduced. It can rely on the spirit of avant-gardism without realizing that, in the dynamics of historical terms, Lacanianism is now too overdetermined to remain a source of artistic, avant-gardist thinking. See Juli Carson, "Excavating Discursivity: Post-Partum Documents in the Conceptualist, Feminist, and Psychoanalytic Fields" (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999).

21. Rem Koolhaas, *Delirious New York: a Retroactive Manifesto for Manhattan* (New York, 1978); Bernard Tschumi, *Architecture and Disjunction* (Cambridge, Mass., 1994); Gevork Hartoonian, *Modernity and Its Other: a Post-script to Contemporary Architecture* (College Station, Tex., 1997).

22. It is clear that those who still operate under the assumptions of that more mobile age will, sadly, not get tenure. Without a Ph.D. or publications from credible university presses, an increasingly broad swath of intellectuals and intellectual hopefuls will be forced to remain on the sidelines. This means that those who do become entrenched in academe will often be those who are the least likely to understand the very processes that have made their discipline possible.

23. By "dialectic," I mean only to call attention to the intellectual issue that is at the heart of all things architectural. The phrase that comes to mind from Hegel is "Wir können nie das Denken unterlassen." It means, loosely, two things: 1) one can never let thought sink below the surface of reality; and 2) thought is not something that will ever disappear. For the first, Hegel implies that we have an individual responsibility to the viability of thought. For the second, Hegel implies that thought protects itself, no matter how much one tries to interrupt its presence. This double aspect of thinking, as something that is both endangered and yet transcendent, is essential to the open-ended condition of modern philosophy.